confers the ideal embodiment a sense of beauty and truth. In other words, the well-shaped man is a focused notion of the body manifold, zoomed in to such a point of specificity that it seems unchanging and absolute.
Active in the first century BC, at the end of the Republican era, Vitruvius became one of the first Western thinkers to turn the human body into a model for the construction of well-shaped buildings. The building Vitruvius had in mind was the ideal Roman temple, which he saw as an organic space where physical and metaphysical, concrete and mathematical, somehow met. The standardised notion of the body described by Vitruvius suits the Roman tendency for universalism and political integration; it is part of the condition of possibility that led to the ordering of the known world in relation to a single geographic point and universal standard: Rome. Thus, a local or culture-specific notion was allowed to become universal, by virtue of a system of power-knowledge grounded on geometry. This standard body made the description of fairly complex forms more feasible on the basis of the visible resemblances between buildings and bodies, the latter being a sort of reservoir for models of visibility and universal reference in the Roman world.
Well-shaped man, Vitruvius reasoned, possessed a perfect architectural design, whose ideal physique hinted at the natural correlation between human proportion and ideal geometric form. In Book III of De Architectura, dedicated specifically to the sacred architecture of temples, Vitruvius explained that his design depended on two things: symmetry (symmetria) and proportion (proportio), and that the beauty of these principles was applicable as much to temples as to the human body. Vitruvius goes on to make a number of famous claims, two of which are worth noting here. Firstly, he argued that it is possible to speak of a bodily centre, inasmuch as the body possesses a navel (umbilicus). The reason why the body-centre is crucial to the realisation of an ideal and universal bodily geometry is because with a centre the body is also capable of describing perfect geometrical shapes. Vitruvius went on to suggest that if a man be placed flat on his back with his hands and feet extended, and a pair of compasses centred at his navel, the fingers and toes of his two hands and feet would touch the circumference of a circle. And just as the human body yields a circular outline, Vitruvius argued, so too a square figure may be found from it. Vitruvius found that in measuring the distance from the soles of the feet to the top of the head, and then by applying that measure to the outstretched arms, the breadth of this outstretched human body would be found to be the same as the height, as in the case of plane surfaces which are perfectly square (Vitruvius 2005).
Secondly, Vitruvius argued that the units of measurement used in architecture are derived from the human body. In other words, according to Vitruvius the body was not only geometrical; furthermore, it was also a universal metric system. The world could be standardised and a single metrical reality could be fashioned by relating things to any part into which the body can be broken down and numericalised. In short, Vitruvius' sense of unity is achieved by stating a relationship between part and whole. Comparison effected according to measurement is reducible, in every case, to the arithmetic relations of equality and inequality derived from standardised bodily parts. Vitruvius concludes: 'there is a symmetrical correspondence between the members separately and the entire form of the body, in accordance with a certain part selected as standard ' (2005: 75) . In other words, the totality is governed by the arbitrary selection of one body part as the governing unit of measurement. This logic situates one particular body-part and one body-type (a young, male Roman) at the centre of the measurable and knowable universe. Thus, the world can be standardised according to cubits, feet, palms, and so on. natural proportion of the body was an analogy of the proportion and the general geometrical laws governing the entire universe.
But da Vinci departed from Vitruvius in many ways, not least because he decided to draw the ideal Man. By drawing the circle and square he correctly observed that the square could have the same centre as the circle, but that it was somewhat lower in the male anatomy. In fact, his discovery seems to suggest that the body's geometry is divided into two very distinct centres and two very different kinds of geometrical behaviour: one being curved, whose centre is the navel, and one straight-lined, whose centre is the phallus. This adjustment, which is the innovative part of da Vinci's drawing, departed from Vitruvius by positing a geometry that is to some extent dialectical, and which can be interpreted artistically and philosophically, as well as mathematically. Furthermore, da Vinci was not content with drawing a body inside a square and a circle. The detail of the man's face, the wavy hair, the details of the muscles, reinforce a contrast between the objectivity of pure mathematics, and the subjectivity of the concrete body as an interpretation of the artist's sensibility. Bataille is intent on denying Engels' suggestion that Calculus opened a sense of dialecticism in the mathematical field by claiming that 'mathematical symbols, translated into every language, can lead to contradictions, but that these are contradictions without reality, they are pseudo-contradictions ' (1985: 111) . By ignoring the possibility that mathematics may be either a dialectical or indeed multiplicitous knowledge, Bataille is unfortunately unable to bring his philosophy of formlessness into play with post-theological mathematics. Bataille argues: 'it is necessary to recognise that this contradiction finally not only troubled mathematicians, but even scandalised them, that they applied all their efforts to the task of eliminating and-it would be vain to deny it-they succeeded ' (1985: 110) . But they didn't. Bataille rejects the idea of an irrational mathematics outright by insisting on the successful formalisation of modern mathematical knowledge.
The (un)living head is transposed to the genitals, and further depicted as a skeleton, confounding life, death, and eroticism as that which exceeds the limits of human reason. To read the Acèphale as a non-Euclidean body is to equate modern geometry with the drunken space of the Acephalic Man, who is now found floating in endless change and continuity, like an intoxicating man-woman in a world that has become a swirling vortex around him-her, where the prudishness of division is discarded in lieu of a confusion and imprecision from where the Acéphale cannot sober up. Utterly unsure of himself, the drunken Acéphale disposes of his timidity and relishes the freedom of being lost, delighted by the fact that he has not arrived and will not arrive at a sense of true identity.
Becoming-the-body is thus the becoming-sober of a new type of modern rationality. Having experienced the drunken space, it becomes apparent that everything that seemed so fixed and natural in the Vitruvian world is de facto a fragment, a local version of a much more complex body manifold.
Andre Masson's cover illustration for the first issue of Georges Bataille's Acéphale (1936) 
Conclusion
The differences and borderlines hailed in the Vitruvian sense of the bodyworld, and supported by a Euclidean ontology, cuts through and organise bodies decisively. By contrast, the non-Euclidean body is disorganised and uncoordinated. This notion of incompleteness and interminability reverses the zoomed-in worldview of Vitruvian corporeality, which as we know relied on the clear-cut, rectilinear and segmented distinction between body and mind, matter and form, identity and alterity. Instead of negating the body, Formlessness indexes the end of God's imitatio, thus 'bringing the body back in' (Rotman 1993), not as a reflection of pure Form, or Godly form, but as a reflection of a reflection, a misperformance, a paradox. This body is an erratic process of becoming or mis-becoming. In other words, whilst Classical conditions of possibility deny the actuality of the body in order to emphasise a godly and disembodied mathematics, modern conditions of possibility do the opposite, by denying the God in mathematics, and affirming a changing and unstable sense of bodiliness. Whilst the Euclidean body encounters itself in the reflection of beauty and truth, the non-Vitruvian body loses itself as a quasi-body, a body that has lost its certainty and completeness, its relation to the singular and the total. The body manifold zooms out, from the particularity and cultural-specific of the Vitruvian Man, to a notion of the Acéphale, the body-to-be. The body manifold argues for the interdependence of these vicinities of cultural discourse-it argues for a nonhistorical, non-rectilinear, foliated understanding of Body in the uncountable affine dimensions that make up cultural continua.
